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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4663 
___________ 
 
MUWSA GREEN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BRIAN D. COLEMAN, SCI Fayette Facility Manager/Superintendent;  
STEPHEN BUZAS, Unit Manager; SUSAN BERRIER, Chief Health Care 
Administrator; GARY GALLUCCI, SCI Fayette Psychologist; LOUIS BOZELLI,  
Licensed Psychology Manager; JANE/JOHN DOE, Mental Health Doctor or Staff 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-00008) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Cynthia R. Eddy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 18, 2014 
Before: JORDAN, COWEN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 19, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Muwsa Green, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order granting 
the defendants’ motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss 
his complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Green, a Pennsylvania prisoner, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against various employees and administrators of SCI-Fayette.  In his complaint, Green 
alleged that the defendants violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him 
after he filed a lawsuit against another correctional institution.  He also alleged that the 
defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to treat his medical and 
mental health issues and by failing to respond appropriately to his suicide attempts.  
Finally, Green alleged that the defendants violated his rights pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act.  Before the defendants had been 
served, Green filed an amended complaint largely restating his original allegations.  One 
defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, and before the court 
ruled on the motion, Green filed a second amended complaint, as well as a response in 
opposition to the motion to dismiss.  The second amended complaint restated the 
allegations of the original and first amended complaints.  The remainder of the 
defendants then moved jointly to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.  The 
parties consented to a Magistrate Judge’s exercise of the jurisdiction of the District Court.  
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The Magistrate Judge granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and determined that 
leave to amend further would be futile.  Green timely appealed.
1
 
II. 
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order.  See Malleus 
v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).  Dismissal is appropriate where the pleader 
has not alleged “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations 
omitted).  This inquiry has three parts:  “(1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) 
reviewing the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-
pleaded components of the complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements 
identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently alleged.”  Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563.   
“[A]n unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is not sufficient for a 
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
678.      
 Upon review, we agree with the Magistrate Judge that Green’s complaint failed to 
state a claim.  As an initial matter, the Magistrate Judge correctly dismissed Green’s 
retaliation claim.  A plaintiff in a retaliation case must prove that: (1) he engaged in 
constitutionally protected conduct, (2) “he suffered some adverse action at the hands of 
                                              
1
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We are mindful that a pro se 
litigant’s complaint is to be construed liberally.  See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 
(3d Cir. 2004). 
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the prison officials”; and (3) “his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or 
motivating factor in the decision to [take that action].”  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 
333 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The requisite causal connection 
can be demonstrated by “(1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the 
protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism 
coupled with timing to establish a causal link.”  Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 
480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007).  Green stated in a conclusory fashion that the 
defendants poisoned his food and assigned him to the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) in 
response to his lawsuit against SCI-Waymart.  Dkt. No. 28, at 3.  Despite amending his 
complaint twice, Green did not allege any facts that would satisfy the third element of a 
retaliation claim, such as the timing of the events in question.  Likewise, his appellate 
brief does not suggest that he could supplement the facts supplied in the complaint, and 
instead reiterates its conclusory statements.  We therefore find that the dismissal of this 
claim without leave to amend was proper.
  
 We further agree with the Magistrate Judge’s dismissal of Green’s claim regarding 
segregated custody, which the Magistrate Judge construed as an Eighth Amendment 
conditions of confinement claim.  The Eighth Amendment imposes upon prison officials 
a duty to provide “humane conditions of confinement.”  Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. 
Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 
(1994)).  “For an alleged deprivation to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment 
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violation, it must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s 
necessities.”  Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).  Such a denial involves “the 
deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise . . . .”  
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).  Green stated only that he had been in 
solitary confinement since October 2009, and that it was causing him psychological 
distress.  Dismissal was therefore correct, as Green did not allege that he was deprived of 
any basic need except medical care, which is discussed in the following paragraph.   
 We agree with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Green failed to state an 
Eighth Amendment claim regarding the denial of medical treatment for his mental health 
issues and other medical concerns.  In this context, the relevant inquiry is whether the 
defendant was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s serious medical need.  See 
Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987).  A 
serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring 
treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity 
for a doctor’s attention.”  Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 
1991).  “To act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly 
disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.”  Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  “Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is 
over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess 
medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.”  United 
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States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette Cnty., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 Green complained of severe chest and stomach pain, pain with urination, and 
difficulty falling asleep.  Dkt. No. 28, at 7.  He stated that he had a history of bipolar 
disorder as well as a personality disorder with borderline and schizoid features.  Id. at 5.  
He claimed that he “waited seven long consecutively stressful months with 
improper/inadequate medical treatment . . . before he was taken to Southwest Region 
[sic] Hospital located in Greene County Pennsylvania.”  Id. at 4.  He also alleged that 
Defendant Mitchell’s tests were inadequate to ascertain his medical condition correctly.  
Id.  He acknowledged that he had received medication for sleep and pain, but stated that 
they were inadequate.  Id. at 7.  Similarly, he alleged that the prison psychologist 
misdiagnosed his mental illnesses and did not provide adequate personal treatment.  Id. at 
4, 5.  These admissions demonstrate that Green did receive some amount of medical 
attention, and that he is merely disagreeing with its type and quantity.  As a result, Green 
was unable to show deliberate indifference, and this claim was properly dismissed 
without leave to amend.   
 Finally, we conclude that Green’s allegations regarding his attempts at suicide did 
not state a valid claim for relief.  Plaintiffs in prison-suicide cases bear the burden of 
establishing three elements:  “(1) the detainee had a ‘particular vulnerability to suicide,’ 
(2) the custodial officer or officers knew or should have known of that vulnerability, and 
 7 
 
(3) those officers ‘acted with reckless indifference’ to the detainee’s particular 
vulnerability.”2  Colburn, 946 F.2d at 1023 (quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 
F.2d 663, 669 (3d Cir. 1988)).  “[T]he requirement of reckless or deliberate indifference 
implies that there must be a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility, that self-
inflicted harm will occur.”  Id. at 1024 (internal quotations omitted).   
 Green stated that he had a history of bipolar disorder, as well as a personality 
disorder with borderline and schizoid features.  See Dkt. No. 28 at 5.  He claimed that he 
had attempted suicide four different times at SCI-Fayette, and that on one occasion, he 
asked Defendant Buzas to contact the psychological department because he felt suicidal, 
but Buzas refused.  Id. at 5, 6.  The complaint did not indicate the dates or nature of his 
four attempts, nor did it indicate whether they took place before or after the incident with 
Defendant Buzas.  The complaint did not allege who knew about the prior attempts.  
Green therefore failed to plead facts that would support the second and third Colburn 
factors by demonstrating that the defendants knew or should have known that Green was 
at risk for suicide, and that they disregarded that risk.  Accordingly, we find that Green 
did not state an Eighth Amendment claim under the Colburn standard.
3
  
                                              
2
 Although this standard is framed in terms of pretrial detainees, we note that the same 
standard may apply to convicted prisoners.  See Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 
F.3d 314, 319 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that “in developing our jurisprudence on pre-
trial detainees’ suicides we looked to the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits the 
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment on convicted prisoners . . . .”).   
 
3
 We further agree with the dismissal of Green’s claims pursuant to the Fourteenth 
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IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.   
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, for the reasons 
stated by the Magistrate Judge.   
